THE LAST SPEECH OF MORO - Lucio D'Ubaldo Back A classic text now. Repeatedly reviewed and commented on the speech to the parliamentary groups - the last before the abduction and killing - is a testament to churn out the almost prophetic, as well as all the qualities and experience all the political ambitions of Aldo Moro. A discourse that nevertheless requires the effort to revive the harshness of a time consumatosi briefly in search of an area of \u200b\u200bcollaboration between the great popular forces in the country. Faced with the risk of an irreversible crisis, made more acute by the daily threat of terrorism, it was the most influential man of the Christian Democrats with the task of outlining the strengths and limitations of a political agreement with the Communist Party.
Only an awareness of the seriousness of that historical moment, thus helping to realize, after many years, the complexity of the intervention force and the Moro. What was the problem? After the '76 elections had failed to agree on a single color hard Democrat, led Giulio Andreotti, who in Parliament had received the so-called "no confidence" by a large parliamentary representation, including the Communist Party. Now, after eighteen months, showed that understanding the rope. Order of the day ended up being inserted therefore request a step further, by passing the foreclosure on the left and the entry of communists in government. A push in this direction were the same as the Socialists, because the new secretary Craxi had not yet considered the abandonment of the line on which prejudicially unitary, moreover, had been wrecked the policy of "balance of more advanced" De Martino.
January 16 1978 the Prime Minister resigned. Shortly thereafter, the central committee of 26 to 28 January, the PCI declared that he could no longer stand the "framework within which was held on the Italian political life for thirty years." And Berlinguer, pressing hard on the majority party, was even come to say in his report that "in case of an aggravation of the crisis ... the government [was right] move [...] the idea that the Democratic Party does not oppose [them ] "in the establishment of a government initiative to parties who have requested a change in the policy framework."
The hypothesis, then, that the Christian Democrats would remain isolated, losing its centrality and ending in the opposition, was not an abstraction.
The long wave of '68 and the '74 referendum on divorce had worn-out Democrat hegemony. By contrast, large sections of the middle class and the bourgeoisie lay felt the attraction to the new policy of "historic compromise", the symbol of the will of the management team to bring Berlinguer to the extreme irreversible choice in favor of democracy as a professor of soil comparison to the action of the labor movement. Even in terms of international relations the old-style neutralism Togliatti gave way to an amazing and courageous Acceptance of the Atlantic Alliance, under whose protective umbrella of the Communist Party in Italy she felt she could embody the democratic function of plausible alternative.
Given this news, the anti-communist ruling seemed about to yield.
Moro may arise in that context, as the leader of self-severe, with great pride of the Democrat: that is, having only joined the two instances conceives and describes the future of a party still going strong and still central to the balance politicians of the country. Difficult undertaking, made more difficult by the harsh reality of power relations. In '69 when he broke with the majority dorotea, More knew to compete with a party in appearance healthy and safe to handle and hold the power. Now the situation was quite different, since the elections of '76 brought to the fore two winners: the Christian Democrats and the PCI. And he was keen to point out, right in his last speech, that two winners in an election always create a problem.
Then the mission was clear and insidious nonetheless. Certainly, for Moro crisis was resolved, because the country needed a new government while giving thanks to the contribution that formal and explicit of the Communist Party could benefit from greater stability and operational capability. However, while Andreotti and Zaccagnini showed any degree of availability, the President of the Christian Democrats openly expressed its reservations on the entry Communists in the executive.
It was therefore to identify the narrow path through which to continue, albeit gradually, to that line of comparison that in the view morotea would lead to a further development of Italian democracy, the Communist Party as a legitimizing force of government. This does not
cracks in the unity of the Christian Democrats, the only real strategy morotea impregnable dogma. Without this certainty, the estate was not imaginable political balance.
Without this balance, the country would be fatally plunged into anarchy and violence. Needed an extraordinary effort that was to pay, in terms of coalitions and parliamentary relations, extreme flexibility. The same, said Moro, who over several decades had guaranteed the DC to present the country in its permanent function of center of gravity of national politics.
the background remained the election. For the more moderate sectors of the Moro party suggests that does not exclude this possibility, although I see the outlines risky and the outcome not at all obvious. What, however, rejects, firmly, is a step ed'irresponsabilità election as a sign of impotence. Instead, the DC was called upon to perform in front of a bewildered and concerned about public opinion, the best of his responsibility as an element decisive and unifying the democratic system. And here was discovered, the effect of a test of wisdom and courage, at the heart of a new central political gain from the field and in full harmony with the great emergencies of the country.
In this sense, he concludes Moro, "the future is still in our hands."
Within this framework took shape the agreement for a new government Andreotti. The line of Moro passed by a majority, not without resistance overt and hidden. On March 8 summit of the five parties (DC-PCI-PSI-PSDI-PRI) approved program guidelines and three days later at the Quirinale Andreotti had a list of ministers. A week after the massacre in Via Fani, the voltage remained high, however: the Communists sounded like a joke because the repetition of a single color led Andreotti no technical or independent persons. Nothing new salient, then, as if the enlargement of the parliamentary majority does not have an effect on governmental structures.
Despite confidence in Brown, Dark was mounting irritation to the shops for an epilogue so dry and disappointing. Some, in retrospect, has overshadowed the question that the Communist Party had gained in those days the conviction to vote against the government. Although many have done to debunk it, it is impossible to refute the state of agitation and confusion in which Berlinguer was then forced to move. Not by chance Gerardo Chiaromonte reported, almost ten years later, a rumor that Moro would impose the kind of ministerial structure with the aim of forcing the Communist Party to deny the trust, then cause the dissolution of the rooms and, only after a new electoral transition, we shall resume the policy of national solidarity. Fire Brigades would rather delete everything suddenly hopes, fears and suspicions lost any value under the hood of an attack to the state, launched with unusual geometric power.
Finally, we need a question. Because the speech Moro, according to the opinion of Pio Marconi, deserves to get into an anthology of texts and studies of school science policy? Rereading or listening to the recording, one feels some discomfort for a rhetorical approach that contrasts with the sensitivity and the rate resulting from the logic of today's TV commercials.
How far between yesterday and today, although More did not speak in the nineteenth century! After thirty years, namely in the space of just a generation, it must take a radical change in the form of communication and structure of significant political message. No one is more able, probably, to follow and appreciate the complex machinery of the argumentative discourse of Moro.
Yet that approach the design and construction, namely the clarity in the realm of brute matter of facts and issues, if they were necessary parts of a sort inevitable, and even that strict control of the balance of power and thrust, upon whose intelligence must be applied with the strength of political design, and behold, all this takes care to convey to those who approach the last reflections of Moro a sense of unconscious admiration. The problems of today are radically different.
There are no more ideological parties, born of the anti-fascist resistance, there is no longer the political struggle that generated and sustained during the Cold War. We store this past, including Moro.
Why do not we? Why
Moro there remains the suggestion of political thought which occurs in the interstices the history of this country, analyze the underlying trends, vices and generosity, the impulses and resistances. Why that thought is able to develop a new perspective and gives us, even today, a lesson in realism and creativity at the same time. Because, ultimately, behind the facade of things related to a specific political season is the passion that the whole is also changing the coordinates, to organize a new political process.
Mind you, not just a question of methodology.
It takes much more than the cold logical development of procedures to get to say that "the future is still in our hands." Above all, having said, it takes persuasion to make the statement - bold for us, Christians are not more Democrats - enters the consciousness and feelings of interlocutors. A capacity
mind in Moro, a tangible sign of moral energy and political will. The
Sources (June 2007) Back
